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In philosophical circles, Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630–-1714) is largely known mainly 
as the friend, patron, and correspondent of Leibniz. While many scholars acknowledge 
Sophie’s interest in philosophy, some also claim that Sophie dabbled in philosophy herself, 
but did not do so either seriously or competently. In this paper I show that such a view is 
incorrect, and that Sophie did make interesting philosophical contributions of her own, 
principally concerning the nature of mind and thought. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In recent years there has been explosion of interest in the philosophical thought of women in 
the early modern period. This heightened interest has led to a great deal of scholarship on six 
thinkers in particular, namely: Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, Margaret Cavendish, Anne 
Conway, Mary Astell, Damaris Masham, and Catharine Trotter. It is perhaps not surprising 
that attention has focused on these thinkers, given that all bar one wrote at least one 
philosophical book, the exception being Princess Elisabeth, who restricted her philosophical 
writing to her correspondence with Descartes. But even though theose six women dominate 
the attention of modern scholars, there were other women who made philosophical 
contributions in the early modern period. This paper is concerned with one of these others—
Electress Sophie of Hanover (1630 – 1714). 
     Nowadays Sophie is best known as the German princess who was almost Queen of Great 
Britain. In March 1701, an act of Parliament (the “Act of Settlement”) named Sophie as 
Queen Anne’s successor to the throne, barring any further issue from Anne. As she was 
almost 35 thirty-five years older than Anne, Sophie suspected that she would not live long 
enough to inherit the crown, a suspicion which that proved to be correct: she died on 8 June 
8, 1714, a little less than two months earlier than Anne (who died on 1 August 1, 1714). 
Ultimately, it was Sophie’s son, Georg Ludwig, who ascended the throne: following the death 
of Anne, he became King George I of Great Britain, the first of the Hanoverian line which 
that ruled Britain for 123 years. 
     In philosophical circles, Sophie is largely known mainly as the friend, patron, and 
correspondent of Leibniz, who was employed by the court of Hanover. Although Leibniz and 
Sophie met often, both professionally and socially, they still corresponded regularly, and 
around 600 items of their correspondence survive today (this figure is inclusive of drafts and 
other variants).<1> One writer remarks that “Their... . . . correspondence covers all possible 
subjects.”<2> And it is indeed broad in extent; for example, some of the topics that came up 
in the correspondence were a man who had a sex change (Leibniz 1923–-, XIV vol. 14, 8-9), 
whether the 18th eighteenth century would begin in 1700 or 1701 (Leibniz 1923–, XVI vol. 
16, 75),<3> and whether a large tooth dug up in Brunswick constituted evidence for the 
 former existence of giants (Leibniz 1923-1923–, VIII vol. 8, 30). Other themes of the 
correspondence were, as one would expect, connected with the social and political events of 
the day, the Hanoverian succession especially. There was also much exchanging of news, 
such as births, deaths, and marriages, details of visitors, journeys undertaken, acquaintances 
made, and so on. Another popular topic was philosophy, discussed in 15 fifteen of the 
surviving letters from Sophie’s side of the correspondence, and 34 thirty-four from Leibniz’s 
side. Moreover, these 15 fifteen letters seem to represent the extent of Sophie’s philosophical 
writing; although she did occasionally write about philosophy to her niece and one of her 
sisters, as we shall see in the next section, such writings appear to have been straightforward 
reports of philosophical ideas she had been told in person by Leibniz or Francis Mercury van 
Helmont, whereas in her correspondence with Leibniz, Sophie engaged in philosophical 
discussion proper. In choosing to discuss philosophy only in her correspondence with 
Leibniz, Sophie took after her sister, Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, who only discussed 
philosophy only in her correspondence with Descartes, as mentioned above. Unlike Elisabeth, 
however, Sophie gets very little attention in the literature on early modern thinkers, and even 
in the literature on women philosophers of that dthis period.<4> Much of what she does get 
merely repeats the point that she was the friend, patron, and correspondent of Leibniz, though 
it is often noted that she had an interest in philosophy too.<5> However, scholars disagree 
about the extent of this interest, with most considering it to have been a passive interest, 
i.e.that is, that Sophie was happy to read philosophy, and to encourage Leibniz to write about 
it to her, but little more than that. Others claim that Sophie did dabble in philosophy herself, 
but did not do so either seriously or competently. If either interpretation is true, it would be 
difficult to quibble with the lack of attention that Sophie has received from historians of 
philosophy, and specifically from those interested in the philosophical contributions made by 
women in the early modern period. However, I believe that neither interpretation does Sophie 
justice;, and the aim of this paper is to show that Sophie is deserving of more scholarly 
attention than she has heretofore received. 
 
 
SOPHIE AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
As previously noted, it is a common claim by those who write about Sophie commonly claim 
that she had an interest in philosophy. The following remarks by Adolphus Ward are fairly 
typical: 
 
Beyond a doubt, Sophia was distinguished by an intellectual curiosity that was still 
uncommon, though much less so than is often supposed, among the women of her 
age. .... . .  She certainly had a liking for moral theology and philosophy, which 
were, in general, more in the way of the ladies of the period than the historical 
sciences. (Ward 1903, 191-93) 
 
     Jacqueline Broad tells us that Sophie “expressed an interest in philosophy” and “was 
extremely curious about intellectual matters, and encouraged the philosophical interests of 
her daughter, Sophie-Charlotte” (Broad 2002, 16 & and 126-27). John Toland, who met 
Sophie in 1701 and 1702, has this to say of her: “She has bin long admir’d by all the Learned 
World, as a Woman of incomparable Knowledge in Divinity, Philosophy, History, and the 
Subjects of all sorts of Books, of which she has read a prodigious quantity” (Toland 1705, 
67;. sSee also Toland 1704, preface, §7). Such remarks give the impression that Sophie’s 
interest in philosophy was restricted to reading philosophical works and encouraging such 
activities in others. It is certainly true that Sophie did such things. We know, for example, 
 that she read works like The Ddivine Bbeing,<6> Treatise on Hhell,<7> The Aart of 
Kknowing Men,<8> Boëthius’s The Cconsolation of Pphilosophy,<9> and Antony Collins’s 
A Ddiscourse of Ffree-thinking.<10> We know that Sophie liked to hear and read Leibniz’s 
philosophical views, and his thoughts on the views of others. And Wwe also know that 
Sophie sent details of some of Leibniz’s views, as well as those of another thinker, Francis 
Mercury van Helmont, to her sister, Louise Hollandine,<11>  and her niece, Elisabeth 
Charlotte, Duchess of Orléans.<12> If keeping abreast of the philosophy of others and 
encouraging others to do the same was the extent of Sophie’s involvement with philosophy, 
then it would be correct to say that her interest in philosophy was generally a passive one. But 
there is more. Some scholars note that Leibniz and Sophie discussed a number of 
philosophical and theological issues face to face.<13> From Leibniz’s side of the 
correspondence we can determine that such issues included proofs for God’s existence,<14> 
ethics,<15> justice,<16> purgatory,<17> the existence and nature of unities/monads<18> and 
so on. Unfortunately there are no records of most of these discussions, so exactly what 
exactly Sophie contributed to them is impossible to determine. Leibniz did make a record of 
one such discussion—a short document entitled (by Leibniz) “Summary of what I said in a 
conversation with Madam the Electress of Brunswick-Lüneberg, in Hanover 29 Xbr 1692” 
(Leibniz 1923-1923–, IX vol. 9, 14-16)—but, as the title suggests, it records only Leibniz’s 
contribution to the conversation. Sophie’s input, if there was any, is unknown. 
     Now Tof course the fact that Sophie had philosophical discussions with Leibniz does not, 
of course, in itself, demonstrate that those scholars who have treated her as no more than a 
minor footnote in the history of philosophy (and the history of women’s philosophy) were 
wrong to do so, especially since we have no idea of what or how much Sophie contributed to 
these discussions. But Ccontrary to common belief, however, Sophie’s involvement with 
philosophy extended beyond reading it, encouraging others to read it, and discussing it 
personally with Leibniz. An examination of her correspondence with Leibniz reveals that she 
herself engaged in philosophy from time to time too, stating her opinions and proffering 
arguments for them.<19> However, the few scholars who have noted this are generally 
dismissive of Sophie’s efforts. For example, F. E. Baily insinuates that Sophie’s attitude 
towardstoward philosophy was less than serious: 
 
A perusal of this correspondence leaves the reader with the impression that Sophia 
looked upon religion and philosophy in the abstract as the mental equivalent of a 
physical daily dozen exercises. She was neither deeply religious nor deeply 
philosophical but she was an epistolary chatterbox, and philosophy and religion 
were two of Leibniz’ pet subjects. (Baily 1938, 119) 
 
     Other commentators state, explicitly or otherwise, that Sophie’s philosophical abilities 
were very limited, citing some of Sophie’s remarks which that suggest that she had difficulty 
grasping basic philosophical ideas. For example, Beatrice H. Zedler writes that “Leibniz tried 
to show Sophie that thought and souls cannot be material, but Sophie will later say that she 
does not understand what is meant by ‘thought’ and by ‘immaterial,’ adding, ‘I confess that 
surpasses me, perhaps because I do not comprehend the terms well enough... . . . to be able to 
penetrate to the truth’” (Zedler 1989, 49; . Cf.compare Broad 2002, 135). The passage Zedler 
has in mind is this one, from Sophie’s letter to Leibniz of 27 November 27, 1702: 
 
I do not understand very well what thought is, and how the immaterial is passive, for 
I do not know what the immaterial is nor how the material-active forms a body with 
the immaterial. I confess that this is beyond me. Perhaps I do not understand the 
 terms of art well enough to be able to penetrate to the truth of the matter. (Klopp 
1873, VIII vol. 8, 401-02. All translations in this paper are my own.) 
 
     Zedler’s partial quotation of this passage strongly suggests that Sophie was utterly out of 
her depth when it came to philosophy, as she struggled to grasp the sort of relatively simple 
concepts central to philosophical debate. However, when this passage is considered in its 
entirety, such a reading is not so obvious. For what exactly is meant by the immaterial being 
passive, and the material-active forming a body with the immaterial? As with all things, of 
course, the context is important. In this case, the context is a paper or set of papers written by 
Jakob Heinrich von Fleming (1667–-1728), a Saxon nobleman who visited the court of Berlin 
in the fall of 1702. Unfortunately it is difficult to piece together Fleming’s views with any 
precision as his writings from this time have since been lost. Probably the most enlightening 
exposition of Fleming’s views appears in Leibniz’s letter to Sophie of 18 November 18, 
1702. In that this letter, Leibniz explains that Fleming had written a paper 
 
in which he says that the immaterial is active, and the material passive. And that an 
inferior activeness, having formed a body with its passiveness, is very often subject 
to another superior activeness, that in this way simple life forms a living body; but 
that a higher activeness, to which this living body serves as matter, forms an animal. 
And that the animal itself serves as matter with regard to the activeness which that 
forms man. And that even man is like matter compared to the supreme activeness 
that is the divinity. (Klopp 1873, VIII vol. 8, 396-97) 
 
     One of the few things that is clear from this passage is that Fleming had developed a very 
abstruse metaphysics; another is that Leibniz expounds it in much too compressed a fashion 
to make its claims easily intelligible. There does exist another paper on Fleming’s views, 
written by an unknown author and sent to Sophie sometime in late 1702, but it throws no 
more light on Fleming’s doctrines than does Leibniz’s exposition.<20> In fact the 
anonymous author of this paper also had some difficulty in grasping Fleming’s views: the 
paper begins with the author stating that it is not possible to come to a judgement about 
Fleming’s philosophy without further clarification. However neither this paper nor Leibniz’s 
letter of 18 November 18 contains any mention of thought or “material actives,” which were 
two of the things that flummoxed Sophie in Fleming’s philosophy. It must therefore be the 
case that the source of Sophie’s confusion was another paper, either by Fleming or by 
someone else writing about Fleming’s views. This paper has unfortunately been lost, so there 
is no way of knowing how lucidly it discussed the terms Fleming used and the philosophy he 
developed. Without this paper, I cannot see that anyone is in a position to draw any 
conclusions about Sophie’s philosophical abilities from the fact that she was unable, by her 
own admission, to understand the things discussed in it. 
     Another oft-cited reason for casting doubt on Sophie’s philosophical competence is that 
apparently she apparently could not understand Leibniz’s doctrine of unities (i.e.that is, his 
doctrine of monads).<21> On various occasions Sophie informs Leibniz that she cannot 
understand his demonstration regarding unities,<22> that she still does not understand 
unities,<23> and that she may have an insufficient understanding of them.<24> Such remarks 
have been seized upon by a number of scholars as evidence that Sophie’s philosophical 
aptitude was relatively poor.<25> But as with the previous case, such a conclusion is shown 
to be somewhat hasty when the context of Sophie’s remarks are is considered. If we conduct 
a thorough examination of Leibniz’s letters to Sophie on the topic of unities, what we find is 
the same argument repeated time and again: there must be unities because there are 
 multitudes, which can be nothing other than the aggregation of unities. Here is a typical 
sample of Leibniz’s remarks on unities from his correspondence with Sophie: 
 
Now it is evident that there could not be composites without simples, nor pluralities 
without unities. (Leibniz 1923, IX vol. 9, 14-16; Leibniz for to Sophie, 29 Dec. 29, 
1692/8 Jan. 8,1693) 
  
unities are souls... . . .  unities have no parts, otherwise they would be pluralities; but 
that which has no parts is indestructible. (Leibniz 1923-1923–, XIII vol. 13, 46-51; 
Leibniz for to Sophie, Oct. 1696) 
 
because every multitude presupposes true unities, it is clear that these unities could 
not be made from matter, otherwise they would still be multitudes and certainly not 
true and pure unities, such as are ultimately needed to make a multitude from them. 
(Leibniz 1923-1923–, vol. 18, XVIII 113-14; Leibniz for to Sophie, 12 June 12, 
1700) 
 
I [have] often said that souls are UNITIESunities, and that bodies are 
MULTITUDESmultitudes, that is, that the soul is a simple substance and that the 
body is an accumulation of several multiple substances. (LBr.F 16, Bl. 52; Leibniz 
to Sophie, 31 Oct. 31, 1705)<26> 
 
     From all this it is clear enough that unities are simple (in that they lack parts), that they are 
souls, and that in aggregation they compose bodies (multitudes/pluralities). This last claim is 
somewhat puzzling, however, for how can an aggregate of souls give rise to a body? Leibniz 
does of course have an answer to this question (which involves treating material bodies as 
phenomenal), but nowhere in his correspondence with Sophie does he see fit to divulge it. 
This means that, so far as Sophie could tell from what Leibniz had written on the subject, 
material things were quite literally composed of immaterial souls. Given the obvious 
difficulty inherent in that this view, it is perhaps not surprising that Sophie was so uncertain 
as to whether she had properly understood what a unity was supposed to be. 
     As it happens, Sophie’s suspicion that she had misunderstood Leibniz’s doctrine of unities 
was well-placed, as is clear from her concern about Leibniz’s claim that there are many 
unities (in fact infinitely many). On one occasion she informed Leibniz that “one should not 
speak of unities where there are several of them,” and in an attempt to understand his doctrine 
she resorted to interpreting a Leibnizian unity as the world-soul, “which one could, in my 
view, call a unity” (Klopp 1873, IX vol. 9, 77; Sophie to Leibniz, 21 Nov. 21, 1701). Sophie 
evidently considered “unity” to mean “unique,” or at least to entail “uniqueness,” which was 
not Leibniz’s understanding at all. However, to construe a “unity” in the way Sophie did was 
not in any way out of step with the French of her day, since according to the 1694 edition of 
the Dictionnaire de L'Académie française, “unité” at the time meant “singularité” (647), 
which in turn meant “qualité de ce qui est singulier” (480), and “singulier” meant “unique” 
(480). The problem, I suspect, was that Leibniz had failed to inform Sophie that he was using 
the term “unité” in a technical, philosophical sense; without that important piece of 
information, Sophie’s belief that he was using the term in its everyday sense seems far from 
censurable. 
     In fact Sophie was not alone in failing to grasp Leibniz’s unities. The Duke of Orléans, 
son of Sophie’s niece, the aforementioned Elisabeth Charlotte, also failed to do so, notably 
after reading one of Leibniz’s letters to Sophie of 31 October 31, 1705.<27> After reading 
this letter, the Duke wrote some comments for Leibniz in which he construed the latter as 
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 advocating the existence of “soul unities” and “material unities” (Klopp 1873, IX vol. 9, 169-
70; The Duke of Orléans to Leibniz [21 February 21, 1706]). Not only did Leibniz not 
attempt to correct the Duke’s misunderstanding, but in a subsequent letter to Sophie he also 
praised the Duke’s “sublime mind” and frothed that the Duke “enters so well into the heart of 
the matter, and goes so much beyond what gave him occasion to discuss it” (Klopp 1873, IX 
vol. 9, 170; Leibniz to Sophie [Mar. 1706]). From thisat, one would be tempted to conclude 
that the Duke had in fact developed Leibniz’s doctrine of unities rather than misunderstood it! 
In any case, the Duke’s misconception of Leibniz’s view is less a reflection of his insight and 
philosophical acumen than it is of Leibniz’s unwillingness to provide (or his carelessness in 
not providing) sufficient information about his doctrine of unities to make that doctrine easily 
intelligible from the outset.<28> 
     It seems to me that Sophie’s only failing in this matter is was her honesty in admitting that 
she could not understand Leibniz’s doctrine, which, I submit, was at best incompletely stated 
to her, and at worst misleadingly stated. Consequently, in neither this case, of Sophie’s 
avowed inability to grasp Leibniz’s unities, nor the one previously discussed, of Sophie’s 
avowed inability to grasp Fleming’s notions of immaterial and material-active, and so onetc., 
are there sufficient grounds to draw any negative conclusions about Sophie’s philosophical 
abilities. 
 
 
SOPHIE AS PHILOSOPHER 
 
Having examined and undermined the popular misconceptions concerning Sophie’s lack of 
philosophical understanding, it is time now to turn to some of Sophie’s positive writings on 
philosophy. As noted earlier, Sophie only discussed philosophy in 15 fifteen of her letters to 
Leibniz, but from these scant pickings we can determine that Sophie was a very independent 
thinker. It might be thought that given Leibniz’s frequent access to Sophie, and his 
willingness to expound his doctrines to her both in person and in by letter, that Sophie would 
have emerged as one of Leibniz’s disciples, as indeed was the case with her daughter, Sophie 
Charlotte.<29> But the evidence suggests that Sophie was no blind follower of Leibniz. In 
fact it is interesting to note just how little influence Leibniz appears to have had on Sophie’s 
philosophical opinions. Indeed, on a number of issues on which Sophie voices her opinion, 
she takes a view diametrically opposedite to view to Leibniz’s. For instance, on the matter of 
optimism, of which Leibniz was a fervent and public supporter, Sophie has this to say: 
 
if it had pleased God to go to the trouble of creating all at once all the men of merit 
that there are, and had spared men the trouble of generation, it seems to me that his 
work would have been more perfect. (Leibniz 1923, VI vol. 6, 40-41; Sophie to 
Leibniz, 4/14 May 4/14, 1691)  
 
Implicit here is Sophie’s belief that many of the people created by God are not 
meritorious, and that such people detract from the goodness or perfection of the world. 
Consequently, by including the non-meritorious in his creation, God’s work is less perfect 
than it otherwise might have been. This is, of course, a very common objection to 
optimism.<30> By making it, Sophie clearly reveals herself to be at odds with Leibniz’s view 
that God has created the most perfect of all possible worlds. 
And on the thorny issue of whether God saves all or condemns some to eternal 
punishment, Sophie writes: 
 
Commented [JP1]: what does this notation mean? Is the 
date ambiguous?  perhaps “May 4 or 14”? Please leave as is: 
the first date corresponds to the Julian calendar, the second to 
the Gregorian calendar, which was not adopted in Protestant 
Germany until 1700. It is commonplace to refer to texts 
written before then by the double dates.  
 I amused myself by reading a book about the island of Formosa where 18 eighteen 
children a year were sacrificed in order to please a single God. It is much more 
reasonable for us to think that the good Lord gave his [son] for us all.<31> 
 
Leibniz himself was himself an advocate of the doctrine of eternal punishment, and 
consistently rejected the doctrine of universal salvation.<32> Moreover, this was a view that 
he was happy to share with Sophie.<33> So on the matters of optimism and universal 
salvation, Sophie adopted positions which that in all likelihood she knew to be contrary to 
those taken by Leibniz. But nowhere is the lack of Leibniz’s influence more pronounced than 
in Sophie’s position on the nature of the mind. As Foucher de Careil correctly reports, Sophie 
“was a materialist... . . . , and it is known that Leibniz was unable to convert her to the idea of 
the immaterial soul” (Foucher de Careil 1876, 52). What led Sophie to reject the idea of an 
immaterial soul in favour of a materialist conception of the mind was her own reflection on 
the nature of mind and thought. In the course of this reflection, she developed several 
arguments in favour of a materialist understanding of the mind, and it is to these that I now 
turn. 
Sophie’s first two arguments for the materiality of the mind emerge from a debate she had 
with the Abbé of Loccum, Gerhard Wolter Molanus (1633–-1722), in late May or early June 
1700. In the debate, Sophie argued for the materiality of the mind, while Molanus argued for 
its immateriality. Sophie subsequently asked Molanus to put down his arguments down in 
writing, which he did, and Sophie then sent Molanus’s paper to Leibniz together with a letter 
containing a summary of her own views and a request that Leibniz act as arbiter. The relevant 
portion of Sophie’s letter, written on 2 June 2, 1700, is the following: 
 
I will ask you to think about the dispute that my son the Elector [Georg Ludwig] had 
on thoughts whichthat, against him [Molanus], my son the Elector maintained are 
material inasmuch as they are composed of things which that enter into us through 
the senses, and inasmuch as one cannot think of anything without making for oneself 
an idea of things which that one has seen, heard, or tasted, like a blind man who was 
asked how he imagined God and said “‘like sugar.”’. (Leibniz 1923-1923–, XVIII 
vol. 18, 91) 
 
     There are in fact two distinct arguments in this passage, though before we consider them, 
we need to address Sophie’s statement that these arguments were in fact those of her son, 
Georg Ludwig (later George I of England). For whatever reason, this appears to be an 
embellishment on Sophie’s part. Indeed, Molanus prepared (for Leibniz’s benefit) his own 
report on his debate with Sophie, and this report makes no mention of the presence or input of 
Georg Ludwig, and instead identifies all the resistance to the conception of the mind as 
immaterial as coming from Sophie: 
 
When our most serene Electress [Sophie] who, as you know, is never able to refrain 
from paradoxes, interrupted me during lunch recently, she provoked me to a 
discussion about the definition of the soul and its real distinction from an extended 
thing. She then asked me to write down my thoughts on this matter; I wrote them 
and sent them to her. The most serene Electress attacked them and did not even 
respond to my arguments, but multiplied questions, as she is in the habit of 
doing,<34> some of which were irrelevant while others were very easy to answer. In 
the end, she said that she would make you be the arbiter of this dispute, and to that 
end would send my paper to you, which she has done I’m sure. (Leibniz 1923-1923–
, XVIII vol. 18, 696; Molanus to Leibniz, 4 June 4, 1700) 
  
     We can only speculate as to why Sophie would credit her son with authorship of the 
arguments mentioned in her letter of 2 June 2, 1700, but whatever the reason may have been, 
I shall take it that the arguments in thisat letter are Sophie’s. 
 
 
ARGUMENT 1 
 
As mentioned above, Sophie’s letter of 2 June 2, 1700 contains two distinct arguments for the 
materiality of the mind. The first one is that “thoughts... . . .  are material inasmuch as they 
are composed of things which that enter into us through the senses.” The argument can be 
expressed thus: 
 
Premise 1: All of our thoughts are composed of things which that enter into us 
through the senses. 
Premise 2: Only material things enter into us through the senses. 
Conclusion: All of our thoughts are composed of material things. 
 
     The second premise I take to be suppressed in Sophie’s account of her argument. The 
conclusion only says only that our thoughts are composed of material things, but if that this 
holds good, then it is reasonable to infer that thoughts themselves must themselves be 
material along with the minds in which they inhere. 
     Leibniz’s response to this argument was is to say 
 
as for the material that enters into the brain through the senses, it is not this very 
material that enters into the soul, but the idea or representation of it, which is not a 
body, but a kind of effort or modified reaction. (Leibniz 1923-1923–, XVIII vol. 18, 
113; Leibniz for to Sophie, 12 June 12, 1700) 
 
     Such a claim was very common in the early modern period, on account of the corpuscular 
hypothesis in vogue at the time. This hypothesis holds held that material objects emit, or 
transmit, or reflect insensible material particles which that are then picked up by a person’s 
sense organs. Many corpuscularians believed that these particles then caused motion of the 
subtly material “animal spirits” running through the nerves, motion which that was 
subsequently carried to the animal spirits in the brain. And Iit was the motion in the animal 
spirits there that was said to somehow produce a perception in the person’s mind, with both 
the perception and the mind generally considered to be immaterial.<35> Where this account 
gets hazy is in the detail of how motion of the material animal spirits in the brain could give 
rise to a perception or thought in the immaterial soul, as corpuscularians generally supposed 
it did. 
     Although Sophie does not offer any remarks on the corpuscular philosophy, she clearly 
accepts the first part of the account just discussed, namely that what enters into our senses is 
material. But that is where the agreement ends. For instead of claiming that the matter 
entering through the sense organs ultimately produces an immaterial perception, Sophie 
supposes that the perception it causes would itself be material in nature. Possibly her reason 
for thinking so was due to the concern, widespread in her day, that it was not clear exactly 
how a material cause could have an immaterial effect. Leibniz’s response does nothing to 
assuage allay that concern. 
 
 
 ARGUMENT 2 
 
Sophie’s second argument for the materiality of the mind in her letter of 2 June 2, 1700 is 
this: 
 
thoughts... . . .  are material... . . .  inasmuch as one cannot think of anything without 
making for oneself an idea of things which that one has seen, heard, or tasted, like a 
blind man who was asked how he imagined God and said “l‘like sugar.”’ 
 
     This argument requires a certain amount of unpacking. To begin withFirst, what exactly 
does Sophie mean by saying that we cannot think of anything without making ideas of things 
that we have sensed? In the French of the time (which was the language Sophie used when 
writing to Leibniz), the word “idée”—“idea”—had three meanings. It could mean an image 
(i.e.that is, a mental picture), a concept (i.e.that is, a notion, a broad understanding), or a 
representation (i.e.that is, a mental stand-in for something, which includes but is not limited 
to images). We can work out which of these meanings Sophie has in mind by looking at her 
example of a blind man who can only think of God in terms of sugar. It is clear enough that 
in this example Sophie isn’t thinking of images, as the blind man presumably couldn’t 
visualize sugar even if he wanted to. Likewise, the blind man presumably wouldn’t be 
thinking of the concept of sugar when he imagines God. Instead, what the blind man seems to 
be doing is trying to form a representation of God, and the closest he can get is sugar (and 
presumably it is the taste of sugar that the blind man thinks of, rather than its smell or how it 
feels to the touch). So from that this I think we can establish what Sophie means when she 
refers to “ideas”—she’s thinking of representations, i.e.that is, mental stand-ins for whatever 
is being thought about. Her example of the blind man also gives us a further clue as to how 
her argument is supposed to work, because the blind man is imagining God. Assuming that 
Sophie considered God to be immaterial, which strikes me as likely, her example involves a 
blind man attempting to form a representation of an immaterial thing—God. The best he can 
do is think of the taste of sugar, but presumably if he wasn’t blind he would think of 
something along the lines of the way God is traditionally depicted—as an old man with a 
beard, for instance. This certainly ties in with Sophie’s claim that we cannot form an “idea,” 
i.e.that is, a representation, of anything unless it’s something we have sensed, something 
material. 
     Although none of this comes across as beingis especially controversial, neither does it 
obviously lead obviously to Sophie’s conclusion that thoughts and minds are material in 
nature. So where does her argument go from here? The crucial thing, I think, is her view that 
we can form representations of material things alone. Sophie seems to take that this point as 
establishing her conclusion about the materiality of thought, which makes sense only by 
supposing that Sophie assumed the truth of a principle along the lines of: “that which 
represents is always of the same nature as what it can represent.” If we feed such a principle 
back into Sophie’s argument and treat it as a suppressed premise, which I think is reasonable, 
this is the resulting argument: 
 
Premise 1: Our thoughts can represent material things alone. 
Premise 2: That which represents is always of the same nature as what it can 
represent. 
Conclusion: Therefore our thoughts are material. 
 
     The second premise itself, unstated but clearly assumed in Sophie’s letter of 2 June 2, 
1700, is undoubtedly inspired by or derived from the principle, in currencycommon with 
 many Greek, medieval, and renaissance thinkers, that “like is known by like,” or at least from 
something very similar. Interestingly, this principle has been used throughout the history of 
philosophy to guarantee the immateriality of what is known by or represented in the 
mind.<36> For as the mind is immaterial (according to many Greek, medieval, and 
renaissance thinkers), and like is known by like, consequently that which is known by or 
represented in the mind (usually taken to be forms or species) must be immaterial too. With 
her variation of the principle that “like is known by like,” Sophie seems to turn this argument 
on its head by wresting out the conclusion that the mind must be material because it can 
represent material things alone. 
     It is interesting to note Molanus’s response to Sophie’s second argument: 
 
[this argument states that] it is impossible to think of something without forming a 
corporeal idea of it. For example, if one thinks of an angel, one imagines a boy who 
has wings; if one thinks of God, one imagines an old man with a long, and grey 
beard. I reply that if the majority of men form ideas like these it is because we are 
accustomed from our youth to having only corporeal things represented in our 
imagination. Nevertheless, when I think of God, I leave behind the images by which 
we are accustomed to represent him as ideas that are not only false, but also 
contradictory, and I consider God as a spiritual being which that has no dependence 
at all on any other being, or as a being possessing all the perfections. (Leibniz 1923-
1923–, XVIII vol. 18, 95; Molanus for to Sophie, June 1700) 
 
     What is striking about Molanus’s reply is that it completely misses the point. His attack is 
focused on premise #1 in the argument as I have constructed it above. Molanus evidently 
construes this premise as claiming that human minds cannot think at all except in terms of 
ideas of corporeal (i.e.that is, material) things. Undoubtedly, what leads Molanus to construe 
it this way is are the various meanings of the French word “idée,” which as I noted earlier can 
mean an image, a concept, or a representation. When faced with Sophie’s statement that “one 
cannot think of anything without making for oneself an idea of things which that one has 
seen, heard, or tasted,” Molanus apparently construed the word “idea” in its broadest possible 
sense, as covering all three of its possible meanings. Consequently Molanus took Sophie to 
be saying that we cannot generate an image, or form a concept, or a representation, of 
anything other than material things. As such, he had little difficulty in finding a counter-
example, namely that humans can form a concept of God, who is an immaterial thing. But as 
it turns out, this is beside the point, for as I have noted above, Sophie uses the term “idea” 
only in its sense of “representation”; her claim is that our mental representations can only 
ever be of material things. Consequently, Sophie could happily accept Molanus’s point that 
we can form an idea (understood as a concept) of an immaterial thing, while continuing to 
hold fast to her point that we can only form an idea (understood as a representation) only of 
material things. 
 
 
ARGUMENT 3 
 
Sophie’s third argument for the materiality of the mind is to be found in her letter to Leibniz 
of 21 November 21, 1701. The relevant passage is this one: 
 
I am not entirely persuaded that thoughts do not occupy place, since; for I find my 
imagination so full that I remember the past and that Iyet have no more room for the 
present, in which I even forget what people look like. It therefore has to be that 
 something material wears out or fills up, which produces the memory and which 
forms the ideas. (Leibniz 1923-1923–, XX vol. 20, 77) 
 
     To understand this argument, we need to remind ourselves that in Sophie’s day it was very 
common to think of the mind as a sort of cabinet, a container of thoughts,<37> which is 
precisely the conception of the mind that Sophie appears to assume. I take this to be so from 
Sophie’s remarks about the imagination being “full,” having “no more room” for new 
memories, and that something material “fills up.” It might be thought that her remark that 
“something material wears out” is at odds with the cabinet view of the mind I have attributed 
to her, but I doubt that it is simply because a material cabinet, which is what I think Sophie 
essentially took the mind to be, could wear out just as it could fill up (either of which would 
reduce its capacity). If Sophie’s remark that “something material wears out” is thought to be 
inconsistent with the cabinet model of the mind, then the only other obvious way of 
interpreting it, to my mind,  is as a reference to a wetware model of the mind, where mental 
processes and functions are thought to be embedded or implemented in the structures of the 
brain. But it stretches credibility to think that Sophie held such a modern view. 
     It seems reasonable to suppose, then, that Sophie conceived the mind as a cabinet or 
container. Now what Sophie does is highlight the fact that the human mind has a limited 
capacity, as there are only so many memories and ideas that it can hold. This leads her to 
suppose that the mental cabinet must be material in nature. Her reasoning here is presumably 
something like this: suppose that the mind is a material container and the ideas and memories 
it contains are material too. This would mean that there is only a certain amount of space in 
the mind, and as each idea and memory takes up some of the available space, we couldn’t just 
keep adding them ad infinitum, as eventually a point would be reached where there is no 
more room in the mental cabinet to add any more. So if we think of the mind as a material 
container, then it’s clear why it has the limited capacity it does. But if the mind were an 
immaterial container, then it is not at all obvious why it should even have a capacity. After 
all, the notion of a capacity, i.e. that is, a limit to how much a thing can contain within itself, 
is very much a material notion, as it trades on the idea of space and things which that occupy 
space. This, I think, is the thrust of Sophie’s argument. 
    To my mind, what Sophie’s argument does is presents the materialist hypothesis as the 
best explanation of certain mental phenomena, like forgetfulness. Given the basic assumption 
that the mind is a container of thoughts, which Sophie held, her argument appears to have 
some merit. Leibniz’s response to this argument was is to appeal to his theory of pre-
established harmony, which in its popular form holds there to be a parallelism between events 
in the (immaterial) mind and the (material) body, without there being any interaction or direct 
causation between them. Hence he tells Sophie: 
 
Regarding the soul’s thoughts, as they must represent what happens in the body they 
could not be distinct when the traces in the brain are confused. So it is not necessary 
that thoughts have a physical location in order to be confused. (Leibniz 1923-1923–, 
XX vol. 20, 85) 
 
     Broadly speaking, Leibniz’s point is that the states of soul and brain mirror or represent 
each other, so that what happens in the brain is represented in the soul, and vice versa. A 
consequence of this, of course, is that when the brain deteriorates, as it does with age, the 
soul experiences a corresponding deterioration in abilities which that parallels but is not 
caused by the deterioration of the brain. Leibniz perhaps does enough to show that the 
existence of certain mental phenomena like forgetfulness are consistent with his own theory 
of pre-established harmony, but he does nothing to show that his immaterial conception of 
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 the mind is preferable to Sophie’s materialistic one. In fact Leibniz’s response is far from 
satisfactory for another reason. As is well known, Leibniz believed that his theory of pre-
established harmony “gives a wonderful idea of .... . .  the perfection of God’s works” 
(Strickland 2006, 75) and admirably demonstrates the extent of God’s wisdom and power 
(the attributes which that conceived and effected such a scheme). But Sophie could easily 
retort that Leibniz’s theory is in fact disadvantageous to creatures endowed with minds, for, 
by making mental events parallel brain events and vice versa, God has ensured that any 
deterioration in key parts of the brain must go hand in hand with a deterioration in the mind’s 
abilities, even though the mind itself has not deteriorated in any way (which it couldn’t for 
Leibniz, given his belief that it is an immaterial—and hence indestructible—soul). Leibniz’s 
theory may well highlight God’s skills as an artisan, but it does so by allowing the corrosion 
of mental abilities even when there is and can be no corrosion in the immaterial mind proper. 
This anomaly is, I should think, an unfortunate corollary of the pre-established harmony, and 
one which that his theory would struggle to explain away. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
On the whole, Sophie’s arguments hold up well to the objections raised against them by 
Molanus and Leibniz, and when placed in their proper context can be seen as respectable and 
original contributions to the early modern debate about the ontological status of the mind. 
Moreover, in arguing for a materialist conception of the mind, a hypothesis widely 
considered to be unfashionable and even heretical in her own day, and in defending it against 
the objections of Leibniz and Molanus, Sophie reveals herself to be an independently -
minded thinker prepared to follow her own philosophical instincts, undeterred by the 
concerns of others. For these reasons alone, I submit that Sophie deserves more sympathetic 
attention from scholars than she has heretofore received, and also a more prominent place in 
the history of philosophy than is given to those who are merely friends of great thinkers like 
Leibniz, or those who merely have a merely passive interest in philosophy. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
I would like to thank Stuart Brown, Daniel J. Cook, and two anonymous Hypatia referees for 
their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. I would also like to thank Vernon 
Pratt for helpful discussions on some of the topics in this paper. 
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vols. IV 4-– XX20. 
2. Dirk van der Cruysse. See Sophie de Hanovre 1990, 15. Cf.Compare Foucher de Careil 
1876, 10. 
3. The issue of when the 18th eighteenth century would begin was hotly debated at the 
time. See Weber 1999, 15. Leibniz correctly noted that the 18th eighteenth century would 
begin in 1701. 
4. In one large volume on the history of women philosophers, for instance, Sophie gets 
only a single, passing mention, as someone who may have had a conversation with George 
Burnet about Catharine Trotter’s Defence of Locke. See Waithe 1995, 123. 
5. See, for example,  Ogilvie 1986, 166; Kersey 1989, 189-90; Garber and Ayers 1998, 
vol. 2, 1464; Broad, 2002; Garber and Ayers 1998, II 1464; Kersey 1989, 189-90; Ogilvie 
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 6. Buchius 1694. See Leibniz 1923-1923–, X vol. 10, 68. 
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Leibniz 1923-1923–, X vol. 10, 68. 
8. des Bans 1702. See Foucher de Careil 1854, 132. 
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19. Some scholars state that Sophie made comments on Leibniz’s views, which is true, 
although such a claim does not adequately capture Sophie’s involvement with philosophy. 
See Garber and Ayers 1998, II vol. 2, 1464; Fara 2004, 146. 
20. See the manuscript held in the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek – 
Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek, Hanover, under the shelf mark LBr.F 27, Bl. 171-2. 
21. Leibniz in fact only uses the word “monad” only once throughout his entire 
correspondence with Sophie, in a paper written on 12 June 12, 1700. See Leibniz 1923-1923–
, XVIII vol. 18, 114. 
22. Leibniz 1923-1923–, vol. 18, XVIII 119-20; Sophie to Leibniz, 16 June 16, 1700. 
23. Leibniz 1923-1923–, vol. XX 20, 61; Sophie to Leibniz, 9 Nov. 9, 1701. 
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1989, 49. 
26. I would like to thank the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Bibliothek – Niedersächsische 
Landesbibliothek in Hanover for their kind permission in allowing me to publish this passage 
from the manuscript. 
27. The published version of this letter, found in Klopp 1873, IX vol. 9, 145-55 and 
Gerhardt 1890, 558-65, is in fact an unsent fair copy made from Leibniz’s (no longer extant) 
second draft. The version of the letter which that Leibniz actually sent to Sophie was 
considerably shorter, and is still unpublished. It is held by the Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 
Bibliothek – Niedersächsische Landesbibliothek in Hanover, under the shelf mark LBr.F 16, 
Bl. 52-3. 
28. This is symptomatic of Leibniz’s general approach to writing philosophy, which, 
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29.  “[Y]Yyou may henceforth consider me as one of your disciples.” Leibniz 1923-1923–
, XVII vol. 17, 438; Sophie Charlotte to Leibniz (22 Aug 22./1 Sept. 1, 1699). 
30. See, for instance, Crousaz 1737, 47. 
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Burnet’s travelogue entry for 19 September 19, 1707, in which Burnet records details of a 
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punish anyone eternally. See Burnet’s Travelogue, Bodleian Library, Oxford, Rawlinson MS 
D. 1092, fol. 126v. I would like to thank an anonymous Hypatia referee for bringing this text 
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34.  “ut fieri solet.” In his book Leibniz et les deux Sophies, Foucher de Careil (1876, 53) 
provides a French translation of Molanus’s letter to Leibniz, which was originally written in 
Latin, and for some reason elects to translate Molanus’s “ut fieri solet” [as she is in the habit 
of doing/as she is accustomed to do] as “comme c’est l’habitude des gens étrangers à ces 
matières” [as is the habit of people who are unfamiliar with these matters]. Foucher de 
Careil’s French translation is problematic, since it goes beyond what Molanus actually wrote; 
in his letter to Leibniz, Molanus merely complains that Sophie is by nature somewhat 
inquisitive and argumentative, but Foucher de Careil’s French translation has Molanus say 
that Sophie’s inquisitive and argumentative nature is a result of her ignorance of 
philosophical matters, which is not a thought to bethat is not found in the Latin letter which 
that left Molanus’s pen. Such an inaccurate translation does nothing to rescue Sophie from 
her undeserved reputation as a philosophical incompetent. And Iin fact, it may have helped to 
cement it, for in a more recent discussion of Molanus’s letter, Beatrice H. Zedler 
unfortunately elects to translate not Molanus’s Latin but Foucher de Careil’s faulty French 
translation of Molanus’s Latin, and hence incorrectly quotes Molanus as saying that Sophie 
multiplied questions “as is the habit of people who are strangers to these arguments.” See 
Zedler 1989, 49. 
35. For a classic treatment of this account, see Locke 1690, II.I.23, II.VIII.4, and II.8.12.,  
36. On this, see Balz 1918, 228. 
37. See, for example, Locke 1690, I.II.15. This is not to suggest, however, that Sophie was 
influenced by Locke. As far as I am aware, there is no evidence that she ever read Locke, or 
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